Offering a new approach to scientific explanation, this book focuses initially on the explaining act itself. From that act, a "product" emerges: an explanation. To understand what that product is, as well as how it can be evaluated in the sciences, reference must be made to the concept of the explaining act. Following an account of the explaining act, its product, and the evaluation of explanations, the theory is brought to bear on these issues: Why have the standard models of scientific explanation been unsuccessful, and can there be a model of the type sought? What is causal explanation, and must explanation in the sciences be causal? What is a functional explanation? The "illocutionary" theory of explanation developed at the outset is used in discussing these issues, and contrasting philosophical viewpoints are assessed.
"A first-rate contribution to the history of nineteenth-century physics....Physicists need to read this book."--Foundations of Physics
"An original, interesting, and substantial contribution to a central topic in philosophy of science, a topic that has important implications in many other philosophical fields. The book is skillfully and elegantly done: the writing is crisp, clear and well paced."--Jaegwon Kim, University of Michigan
"The most significant addition to the literature on explanation since Hempel's Aspects of Scientific Explanation, and indeed in some ways even surpasses the latter in terms of its depth and imaginative vision. No discussion of explanation can with impunity overlook this book and the host of thought-provoking arguments contained in it."--British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
"Themost comprehensive approach to the theory of explanation that has been produced in recent years and perhaps will be produced for many years to come."--International Studies in Philosophy
Offering a new approach to scientific explanation, this book focuses initially on the explaining act itself. From that act, a "product" emerges: an explanation. To understand what that product is, as well as how it can be evaluated in the sciences, reference must be made to the concept of the explaining act. Following an account of the explaining act, its product, and the evaluation of explanations, the theory is brought to bear on these issues: Why have the standard models of scientific explanation been unsuccessful, and can there be a model of the type sought? What is causal explanation, and must explanation in the sciences be causal? What is a functional explanation? The "illocutionary" theory of explanation developed at the outset is used in discussing these issues, and contrasting philosophical viewpoints are assessed.
"A first-rate contribution to the history of nineteenth-century physics....Physicists need to read this book."--Foundations of Physics
"An original, interesting, and substantial contribution to a central topic in philosophy of science, a topic that has important implications in many other philosophical fields. The book is skillfully and elegantly done: the writing is crisp, clear and well paced."--Jaegwon Kim, University of Michigan
"The most significant addition to the literature on explanation since Hempel's Aspects of Scientific Explanation, and indeed in some ways even surpasses the latter in terms of its depth and imaginative vision. No discussion of explanation can with impunity overlook this book and the host of thought-provoking arguments contained in it."--British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
"Themost comprehensive approach to the theory of explanation that has been produced in recent years and perhaps will be produced for many years to come."--International Studies in Philosophy