In recent decades, the economists' concept of rational choice has dominated legal
reasoning. And yet, in practical terms, neither the lawbreakers the law addresses nor officers of
the law behave as the hyperrational beings postulated by rational choice. Critics of rational choice
and believers in "fast and frugal heuristics" propose another approach: using certain formulations
or general principles to help navigate in an environment that is not a well-ordered
setting with an occasional disturbance, as described in the language of rational choice, but instead
is fundamentally uncertain or characterized by an unmanageable degree of complexity. This is the
intuition behind behavioral law and economics. In Heuristics and the Law, experts in law,
psychology, and economics explore the conceptual and practical power of the heuristics approach in
law. They discuss legal theory; modeling and predicting the problems the law purports to solve; the
process of making law, in the legislature or in the courtroom; the application of existing law in
the courts, particularly regarding the law of evidence; and implementation of the law and the impact
of law on behavior.Contributors:Ronald J. Allen, Hal R. Arkes, Peter Ayton, Susanne Baer, Martin
Beckenkamp, Robert Cooter, Leda Cosmides, Mandeep K. Dhami, Robert C. Ellickson, Christoph Engel,
Richard A. Epstein, Wolfgang Fikentscher, Axel Flessner, Robert H. Frank, Bruno S. Frey, Gerd
Gigerenzer, Paul W. Glimcher, Daniel G. Goldstein, Chris Guthrie, Jonathan Haidt, Reid Hastie, Ralph
Hertwig, Eric J. Johnson, Jonathan J. Koehler, Russell Korobkin, Stephanie Kurzenhäuser, Douglas A.
Kysar, Donald C. Langevoort, Richard Lempert, Stefan Magen, Callia Piperides, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Clara Sattler de Sousa e Brito, Joachim Schulz, Victoria A. Shaffer, Indra Spiecker genannt Döhmann,
John Tooby, Gerhard Wagner, Elke U. Weber, Bernd Wittenbrink
In recent decades, the economists' concept of rational choice has dominated legal
reasoning. And yet, in practical terms, neither the lawbreakers the law addresses nor officers of
the law behave as the hyperrational beings postulated by rational choice. Critics of rational choice
and believers in "fast and frugal heuristics" propose another approach: using certain formulations
or general principles to help navigate in an environment that is not a well-ordered
setting with an occasional disturbance, as described in the language of rational choice, but instead
is fundamentally uncertain or characterized by an unmanageable degree of complexity. This is the
intuition behind behavioral law and economics. In Heuristics and the Law, experts in law,
psychology, and economics explore the conceptual and practical power of the heuristics approach in
law. They discuss legal theory; modeling and predicting the problems the law purports to solve; the
process of making law, in the legislature or in the courtroom; the application of existing law in
the courts, particularly regarding the law of evidence; and implementation of the law and the impact
of law on behavior.Contributors:Ronald J. Allen, Hal R. Arkes, Peter Ayton, Susanne Baer, Martin
Beckenkamp, Robert Cooter, Leda Cosmides, Mandeep K. Dhami, Robert C. Ellickson, Christoph Engel,
Richard A. Epstein, Wolfgang Fikentscher, Axel Flessner, Robert H. Frank, Bruno S. Frey, Gerd
Gigerenzer, Paul W. Glimcher, Daniel G. Goldstein, Chris Guthrie, Jonathan Haidt, Reid Hastie, Ralph
Hertwig, Eric J. Johnson, Jonathan J. Koehler, Russell Korobkin, Stephanie Kurzenhäuser, Douglas A.
Kysar, Donald C. Langevoort, Richard Lempert, Stefan Magen, Callia Piperides, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Clara Sattler de Sousa e Brito, Joachim Schulz, Victoria A. Shaffer, Indra Spiecker genannt Döhmann,
John Tooby, Gerhard Wagner, Elke U. Weber, Bernd Wittenbrink