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Custer and Cognition

Custer and Cognition

Institute for National Strategic Studies
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Opinions are sharply divided about whether George Armstrong Custer was a brilliant tactician or a compulsive risktaker. Was the massacre at the Little Bighorn the result of his misfortune or his audacity? This article does not aim to settle the argument between admirers and critics. Rather, it uses a new explanatory model of cognition in combat1 to explore what Custer’s case suggests about decisionmaking in today’s era of networked warfare.

How does this flamboyant 19th-century cavalry officer relate to information-age
military decisionmaking? After all, Custer’s “bandwidth”—binoculars and scouts—was negligible by today’s standards. Yet there are good reasons to consider his experience. First, 19th-century cavalry action was a precursor of the fast-breaking distributed warfare that characterizes the network era. Cavalry-type missions and qualities are relevant in current warfare. The cavalry had to respond to the unfamiliar, unclear, and unanticipated. More than those who directed set-piece infantry maneuvers and artillery bombardments, cavalry commanders
had to make prompt decisions under fluid and ambiguous conditions, often victories, and only one was a clear defeat, suggesting superb decisionmaking and perhaps high self-regard. Yet his cognition failed utterly at the Little Bighorn. The contrast offers fuel for analysis if we can deduce why and how he made his decisions.

We begin by offering a model for effective decisionmaking in combat when time
is short, danger is great, and conditions are unfamiliar and dynamic. We call this battlewisdom. If Custer was battle-wise in earlier battles, why not in his final one? By observing him in that light, we can learn about good and bad decisionmaking in combat as well as about the man who made the Last Stand.
Language
English
Pages
19
Format
Kindle Edition
Publisher
Penny Hill Press Inc,
Release
November 23, 2006

Custer and Cognition

Institute for National Strategic Studies
0/5 ( ratings)
Read Download
Opinions are sharply divided about whether George Armstrong Custer was a brilliant tactician or a compulsive risktaker. Was the massacre at the Little Bighorn the result of his misfortune or his audacity? This article does not aim to settle the argument between admirers and critics. Rather, it uses a new explanatory model of cognition in combat1 to explore what Custer’s case suggests about decisionmaking in today’s era of networked warfare.

How does this flamboyant 19th-century cavalry officer relate to information-age
military decisionmaking? After all, Custer’s “bandwidth”—binoculars and scouts—was negligible by today’s standards. Yet there are good reasons to consider his experience. First, 19th-century cavalry action was a precursor of the fast-breaking distributed warfare that characterizes the network era. Cavalry-type missions and qualities are relevant in current warfare. The cavalry had to respond to the unfamiliar, unclear, and unanticipated. More than those who directed set-piece infantry maneuvers and artillery bombardments, cavalry commanders
had to make prompt decisions under fluid and ambiguous conditions, often victories, and only one was a clear defeat, suggesting superb decisionmaking and perhaps high self-regard. Yet his cognition failed utterly at the Little Bighorn. The contrast offers fuel for analysis if we can deduce why and how he made his decisions.

We begin by offering a model for effective decisionmaking in combat when time
is short, danger is great, and conditions are unfamiliar and dynamic. We call this battlewisdom. If Custer was battle-wise in earlier battles, why not in his final one? By observing him in that light, we can learn about good and bad decisionmaking in combat as well as about the man who made the Last Stand.
Language
English
Pages
19
Format
Kindle Edition
Publisher
Penny Hill Press Inc,
Release
November 23, 2006

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