One Year Later: BP Deepwater Horizon Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Reports - Presidential Commission plus the 2011 Coast Guard Investigation into the Explosion, Fire, and Sinking on April 20, 2010
One Year Later: BP Deepwater Horizon Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Reports - Presidential Commission plus the 2011 Coast Guard Investigation into the Explosion, Fire, and Sinking on April 20, 2010
This compendium of two major federal reports provides coverage of the Deepwater Horizon accident, with the text of the January 2011 Report of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, plus the
2011 U.S. Coast Guard Report of the Investigation into the Explosion, Fire, and Sinking aboard the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit.
Book 1: This report by the Presidentially-appointed Oil Spill Commission, released in January 2011, provides authoritative, official findings on the causes and consequences of the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, with proposals for comprehensive reforms of both government and industry practices to overhaul the U.S. approach to drilling safety and greatly reduce the chances of a similar, large scale disaster in the future. Backed up by hundreds of footnotes, the contents include: The Deepwater Horizon, the Macondo Well, and Sudden Death on the Gulf of Mexico; The History of Offshore Oil and Gas in the United States; Oversight—and Oversights—in Regulating; The Macondo Well and the Blowout; Response and Containment; Oiling a Rich Environment: Impacts and Assessment; Recovery and Restoration; Changing Business as Usual; Investing in Safety, Investing in Response, Investing in the Gulf; American Energy Policy and the Future of Offshore Drilling. On April 20, 2010, while working on an exploratory well approximately 50 miles southeast of Venice, Louisiana, the semi-submersible drilling rig Deepwater Horizon experienced an explosion and fire, killing eleven workers. The damaged platform capsized and sank on April 22, 2010. The rig was owned by Transocean and under contract to British Petroleum .
Book 2: This long-awaited report by the U.S. Coast Guard provides authoritative, official findings on the investigation into the circumstances surrounding the explosion, fire, sinking and loss of eleven crew members aboard the mobile offshore drilling unit Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010.
The Joint Investigation Team comprised of members from the U.S. Coast Guard and Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement examined five aspects of this disaster relating to areas of responsibility of the U.S. Coast Guard: the explosions, the fire, the evacuation, the flooding and sinking of the MODU, and the safety systems of DEEPWATER HORIZON and its owner-operator, Transocean. Although the events leading to the sinking of DEEPWATER HORIZON were set into motion by the failure to prevent a well blowout, the investigation revealed numerous systems deficiencies, and acts and omissions by Transocean and its DEEPWATER HORIZON crew, that had an adverse impact on the ability to prevent or limit the magnitude of the disaster. These included poor maintenance of electrical equipment that may have ignited the explosion, bypassing of gas alarms and automatic shutdown systems that could prevent an explosion, and lack of training of personnel on when and how to shutdown engines and disconnect the MODU from the well to avoid a gas explosion and mitigate the damage from an explosion and fire. These deficiencies indicate that Transocean’s failure to have an effective safety management system and instill a culture that emphasizes and ensures safety contributed to this disaster.
This is a privately authored news service and educational publication of Progressive Management. Our e-books put knowledge at your fingertips, and an expert in your pocket!
Language
English
Format
Kindle Edition
Release
April 25, 2011
One Year Later: BP Deepwater Horizon Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Reports - Presidential Commission plus the 2011 Coast Guard Investigation into the Explosion, Fire, and Sinking on April 20, 2010
This compendium of two major federal reports provides coverage of the Deepwater Horizon accident, with the text of the January 2011 Report of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, plus the
2011 U.S. Coast Guard Report of the Investigation into the Explosion, Fire, and Sinking aboard the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit.
Book 1: This report by the Presidentially-appointed Oil Spill Commission, released in January 2011, provides authoritative, official findings on the causes and consequences of the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, with proposals for comprehensive reforms of both government and industry practices to overhaul the U.S. approach to drilling safety and greatly reduce the chances of a similar, large scale disaster in the future. Backed up by hundreds of footnotes, the contents include: The Deepwater Horizon, the Macondo Well, and Sudden Death on the Gulf of Mexico; The History of Offshore Oil and Gas in the United States; Oversight—and Oversights—in Regulating; The Macondo Well and the Blowout; Response and Containment; Oiling a Rich Environment: Impacts and Assessment; Recovery and Restoration; Changing Business as Usual; Investing in Safety, Investing in Response, Investing in the Gulf; American Energy Policy and the Future of Offshore Drilling. On April 20, 2010, while working on an exploratory well approximately 50 miles southeast of Venice, Louisiana, the semi-submersible drilling rig Deepwater Horizon experienced an explosion and fire, killing eleven workers. The damaged platform capsized and sank on April 22, 2010. The rig was owned by Transocean and under contract to British Petroleum .
Book 2: This long-awaited report by the U.S. Coast Guard provides authoritative, official findings on the investigation into the circumstances surrounding the explosion, fire, sinking and loss of eleven crew members aboard the mobile offshore drilling unit Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010.
The Joint Investigation Team comprised of members from the U.S. Coast Guard and Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement examined five aspects of this disaster relating to areas of responsibility of the U.S. Coast Guard: the explosions, the fire, the evacuation, the flooding and sinking of the MODU, and the safety systems of DEEPWATER HORIZON and its owner-operator, Transocean. Although the events leading to the sinking of DEEPWATER HORIZON were set into motion by the failure to prevent a well blowout, the investigation revealed numerous systems deficiencies, and acts and omissions by Transocean and its DEEPWATER HORIZON crew, that had an adverse impact on the ability to prevent or limit the magnitude of the disaster. These included poor maintenance of electrical equipment that may have ignited the explosion, bypassing of gas alarms and automatic shutdown systems that could prevent an explosion, and lack of training of personnel on when and how to shutdown engines and disconnect the MODU from the well to avoid a gas explosion and mitigate the damage from an explosion and fire. These deficiencies indicate that Transocean’s failure to have an effective safety management system and instill a culture that emphasizes and ensures safety contributed to this disaster.
This is a privately authored news service and educational publication of Progressive Management. Our e-books put knowledge at your fingertips, and an expert in your pocket!