First published in 1971 by the U.S. Army War College, this report was classified as "Confidential" and not for public distribution. It was declassified many years later . The Phoenix Program, originally called Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation was just one of several pacification programs used in South Vietnam. It was designed to "protect the Vietnamese people from terrorism and political, paramilitary, economic and subversive pressure from the Communist clandestine organization in South Vietnam" . At its core, it was an intelligence operation designed to gather and analyze information on the Viet Cong Infrastructure . This report examines the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program that existed in Vietnam during the war years, and assesses its ability to perform its mission. The assessment is based on a comparison of the measures used to bring the Malayan Emergency to a successful conclusion, with the measures that were used in the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program to neutralize the Viet Cong Infrastructure. The report ends with a chapter listing conclusions and recomendations that could have been made for the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program in Vietnam.
Pages
86
Format
Kindle Edition
Publisher
US Army War College
Release
June 29, 2016
Phoenix/Phung Hoang and the Future: A Critical Analysis of the US/GVN Program to Neutralize the Viet Cong Infrastructure
First published in 1971 by the U.S. Army War College, this report was classified as "Confidential" and not for public distribution. It was declassified many years later . The Phoenix Program, originally called Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation was just one of several pacification programs used in South Vietnam. It was designed to "protect the Vietnamese people from terrorism and political, paramilitary, economic and subversive pressure from the Communist clandestine organization in South Vietnam" . At its core, it was an intelligence operation designed to gather and analyze information on the Viet Cong Infrastructure . This report examines the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program that existed in Vietnam during the war years, and assesses its ability to perform its mission. The assessment is based on a comparison of the measures used to bring the Malayan Emergency to a successful conclusion, with the measures that were used in the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program to neutralize the Viet Cong Infrastructure. The report ends with a chapter listing conclusions and recomendations that could have been made for the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Program in Vietnam.