Ordinary-language philosophy was an attempt to overcome the self-imposed irrelevance of most of the traditional schools of philosophy in the early 20th century. In its many years of stimulating give-and-take among partisans, it exerted an immense influence on philosophical thought and helped to clarify many philosophical issues. There is no doubt of its permanent contribution to the progress of philosophy.
To help students gain a deeper understanding of the different aspects of this philosophy, editor V.C. Chappell has brought together five seminal articles by five illustrious modern philosophers in this collection.
Norman Malcolm's 'Moore and Ordinary Language' is a clear, plausible defense of the Wittgensteinian view of ordinary-language philosophy.
Then Gilbert Ryle in 'Ordinary Language' and J.L. Austin in 'A Plea For Excuses' compellingly state the case for the Oxford group of ordinary-language philosophers.
Finally, Benson Mates criticizes ordinary-language philosophy in 'On the Verification of Statements about Ordinary Language', and Stanley Cavell answers Mates in 'Must We Mean What We Say?', probably the most detailed explanation and defense of the procedures of the ordinary-language philosophers that has ever been written.
Ordinary-language philosophy was an attempt to overcome the self-imposed irrelevance of most of the traditional schools of philosophy in the early 20th century. In its many years of stimulating give-and-take among partisans, it exerted an immense influence on philosophical thought and helped to clarify many philosophical issues. There is no doubt of its permanent contribution to the progress of philosophy.
To help students gain a deeper understanding of the different aspects of this philosophy, editor V.C. Chappell has brought together five seminal articles by five illustrious modern philosophers in this collection.
Norman Malcolm's 'Moore and Ordinary Language' is a clear, plausible defense of the Wittgensteinian view of ordinary-language philosophy.
Then Gilbert Ryle in 'Ordinary Language' and J.L. Austin in 'A Plea For Excuses' compellingly state the case for the Oxford group of ordinary-language philosophers.
Finally, Benson Mates criticizes ordinary-language philosophy in 'On the Verification of Statements about Ordinary Language', and Stanley Cavell answers Mates in 'Must We Mean What We Say?', probably the most detailed explanation and defense of the procedures of the ordinary-language philosophers that has ever been written.