Who will the United States fight against and who will fight with
it? Where will these future conflicts be fought? What will future
conflicts look like? How will they be fought? And why will the
United States go to war? ?is report is the overview in a series
that draws on a wide variety of data sets, secondary sources,
and an extensive set of interviews in eight countries around the
globe to answer these questions. ?e authors conclude that the United States
will confront a series of deepening strategic dilemmas in 2030. U.S. adversaries—
China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and terrorist groups—will? likely remain constant,
but U.S. allies are liable to change, and the location of where the United States
is most likely to fight wars may not match the locations where conflicts could
be most dangerous to U.S. interests. ?e joint force will likely face at least four
types of conflict, each requiring a somewhat different suite of capabilities, but
the U.S. ability to resource such a diverse force will likely decline. Above a?,
barring any radical attempt to alter the trajectory, the United States in 2030 could
progressively lose the initiative to dictate strategic outcomes and to shape when
and why the wars of the future occur. To meet future demands, the joint force and
the U.S. Air Force should invest in more precision, information, and automation;
build additional capacity; maintain a robust forward posture; and reinforce agility at all levels of warfare.
Who will the United States fight against and who will fight with
it? Where will these future conflicts be fought? What will future
conflicts look like? How will they be fought? And why will the
United States go to war? ?is report is the overview in a series
that draws on a wide variety of data sets, secondary sources,
and an extensive set of interviews in eight countries around the
globe to answer these questions. ?e authors conclude that the United States
will confront a series of deepening strategic dilemmas in 2030. U.S. adversaries—
China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and terrorist groups—will? likely remain constant,
but U.S. allies are liable to change, and the location of where the United States
is most likely to fight wars may not match the locations where conflicts could
be most dangerous to U.S. interests. ?e joint force will likely face at least four
types of conflict, each requiring a somewhat different suite of capabilities, but
the U.S. ability to resource such a diverse force will likely decline. Above a?,
barring any radical attempt to alter the trajectory, the United States in 2030 could
progressively lose the initiative to dictate strategic outcomes and to shape when
and why the wars of the future occur. To meet future demands, the joint force and
the U.S. Air Force should invest in more precision, information, and automation;
build additional capacity; maintain a robust forward posture; and reinforce agility at all levels of warfare.